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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH; 
DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
BUSINESS REGULATION; COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES; 
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The respondents named above respectfully submit this 
response to the brief of petitioner The Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph Company ("Mountain Bell" or "Bell"). 
The brief responds to the four points of Mountain 
Bell's argument in the same order; an additional point (V) 
raises an issue Bell did not address. The sections of the 
utilities statutes are referred to by citation of the section 
number only; except as noted the references are to Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 (1986 Repl. Vol. 6A). The record is cited 
-R .-
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Jurisdiction is conferred by § 54-7-16• 
In the proceedings below the Public Service Commission 
promulgated a rule that (1) established a lowered (-lifeline-) 
rate for low-income telephone customers, (2) imposed small 
surcharges upon non-lifeline customers and upon long distance 
services to make up the reduced revenues and administrative 
costs of the participating telephone carriers, and (3) ordered 
a pooling of the surcharges and a distribution among such 
carriers. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether any judicial deference is to be accorded 
the Commission's decision to pool the surcharges, where the 
petitioning carrierfs challenge is that the pooling improperly 
discriminates against petitioner's customers. 
2. Whether the Commission is authorized by statute 
to fund the telephone lifeline program by pooling lifeline 
surcharges on a joint or industry basis rather than funding it 
on a company-specific basis. 
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3. Whether the pooling here ordered is a valid 
exercise of the Commission's authority to classify customers 
for ratemaking purposes. 
4. Whether the surcharge pooling is an unlawful tax. 
5. Whether a reversal of the Commission's surcharge 
pooling decision would operate to set aside the Lifeline Rules 
in their entirety. 
CITATION OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
(Text of statutes in Addendum) 
§ 54-3-1 § 54-4-7 
§ 54-3-4 § 54-4-8 
§ 54-3-8 § 54-4-12 
§ 54-4-1 § 54-4-13(1) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Qf the C9S9 
This is a petition by Mountain Bell for the Court's 
review of that part of the Lifeline Rules requiring the 
participating telephone carriers to pool the lifeline 
surcharges. The petition does not challenge any other element 
of the rules. 
B. Course of proceedings and 
fligpQgitiQn frelQw. 
The Commission commenced these proceedings in June 
1985 to consider adoption of a rule that would afford a lowered 
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telephone rate to low income households (R 337). Numerous 
parties (the Division of Public Utilities, the Committee of 
Consumer Services, thirteen telephone corporations providing 
local exchange service in Utah, a long-distance carrier (AT&T), 
and two consumer organizations) appeared (R 1, 2). 
The Commission first asked the parties to brief 
several issues, including the issue whether it had authority to 
order a "lifeline- service (R 349 et seq.). It then received 
sworn pre-filed testimony,1 and conducted several days of cross 
examination hearings and a public witness session. Thereafter, 
all parties submitted a settlement stipulation (Exh. A to this 
brief; R 620-8), which the Commission approved (R 636). The 
Commission promulgated the Lifeline Rules to be effective 
January 1, 1987 (R 630-635). (The text is an Exhibit (A) to 
Mountain Bell's brief). 
Mountain Bell twice sought Commission rehearings, 
limited to a challenge to the surcharge pooling element of the 
rules, which the Commission denied. This petition for review, 
also limited to that one issue, followed. 
1
 The record certified to the Court does not include the 
voluminous pre-filed testimony and exhibits, but does include 
each witness's summary. Because the facts are stipulated, 
respondents have not asked supplementation of the record. 
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C. Stfrtement pf the Facts 
Part 1 of this statement supplements the Mountain Bell 
statement with additional material, and part 2 corrects a basic 
error in the Bell statement. 
1. Facts and background. 
The Commission described the legal background of these 
proceedings as a part of its explanatory Report And Order of 
December 17, 1986 (Exhibit B; R 643-651): in April 1985 a 
memorandum of the Division of Public Utilities (R 331-336) 
called the Commissions attention to an order of the Federal 
Communications Commission that imposed upon all telephone 
customers a local "end-user" charge (or customer access line 
charge; the CALC, so-called) of $1 per month until June 1, 1986 
and $2 per month thereafter (R 643 et seq.). In reaction to 
proposals for Congressional intervention (R 644), the FCC 
convened a federal-state Joint Board to study the subject. The 
Board recommended that the FCC waive the CALC for low-income 
subscribers in states adopting a qualified lifeline plan, and 
the FCC adopted the Board's recommendation (R 644). 
At the beginning of the Utah proceedings, the 
Commission raised several issues, including the issue whether 
it had authority to establish a "lifeline" program. Each 
responding party concluded that the Commission had such 
authority, if properly exercised (R 359-381). Each analysis 
was based on Mountain States Legal Fn. v. Utah Public Service 
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Com'n, 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981), the electricity lifeline 
case. The Commission then made a declaratory order reaching 
the same conclusion, citing Mountain States and noting the 
decision's requirements of a complete and fully explained 
supporting record (Declaratory Order 1/3/86, Exhibit C; R 472 
et seq.). 
Lengthy adversarial hearings followed. On December 1, 
1986 all appearing parties entered into a settlement 
stipulation (Exh. A; R 643 et seq.), which the Commission 
approved. Based thereon, and on the record, the Commission 
found and concluded that in low-income households in this state 
the telephone penetration figures are substantially lower than 
the average for all customers (R 646, If 1), and that in low 
income households higher local rates pose a threat of customer 
drop-off from the telephone network (R 647). The stipulation 
provided agreed projections as to the number of potential Utah 
lifeline customers should a lifeline rate be adopted, 
annualized carrier costs, and the surcharge rate needed to 
recover the carriers' revenue deficiencies and costs (R 
636-642). 
The Commission promulgated the Lifeline Rules and 
ordered the service beginning January 1, 1987. The rules 
establish a lifeline rate of $9.45 per month for those 
subscribers qualifying for aid under specified programs 
administered by the Department of Social Services (R 630). The 
carriers having a higher rate (they are Bell, Contel, and 
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Beehive) were directed to amend their tariffs to put the 
lifeline rate into effect. Eighty percent of the net revenue 
losses and administrative costs of the participating carriers 
is funded by an 18 cent monthly surcharge on non-lifeline 
customers, and 20% is funded by a small surcharge upon 
intrastate tolls and an access charge upon alternate toll 
carriers (R 637). 
The Commission's two Reports of December 17, 1987 
supply its conclusions and explanations of the rates, the rate 
classifications, and the administrative methods (R 636; R 643), 
and these are explained further in the Commission's denials of 
Bell's rehearing applications (R 673-5; R 684-7). 
The lifeline rule is based in part upon the policy of 
universal telephone service (Exh. B; R 647): 
3. The Commission has long supported the policy 
of universal service, by which' is meant the offering 
of affordable telephone service to as many of the 
citizens of the State as possible. . ." 
The Commission stated the conclusions that universal service 
benefits all telephone customers; that its promotion means 
greater communications access to all; that it enhances 
business, the quality of life, and governmental efficiencies; 
and that it avoids the stranding of capital facilities (Exh. B 
V 4; R 647). 
The Utah lifeline rule was held by the FCC to meet the 
federal guidelines (R 682-3), with a resultant waiver of the 
federal CALC for Utah lifeline customers. 
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The record before the Court supports the findings and 
conclusions. See, e.g., the testimony of the Division's expert 
witness Hinton: R 10-11 as to telephone penetration levels; R 
12-14 as to "externalities," or the economic benefits for 
non-lifeline customers, and the State; R 14-15 as to the 
avoidance of stranded facilities, and other customer drop-off 
consequences; and R 67, agreement that a Bell customer benefits 
from "customers staying on Continental's system and vice versa." 
2. Correction of Bell's statement of fgcts. 
Bell's descriptions of the lifeline program and the 
funding arrangement (Bell brief pp 4-6, "A" and "B") are 
accurate, but its description of the effect of surcharge 
pooling (Bell brief pp 6-8, "C") is materially distorted. The 
Bell brief purports to compare the Bell percentage of lifeline 
customers (said to be 8% of its total residence lines) with 
Contel's (purportedly 20%). As is shown below, the actual 
percentages, based upon the program as adopted, are: Bell 
6.38%, and Contel 7.85%. Bell stipulated to the figures 
(potential lifeline customers, residential line counts) that go 
into these actual percentage computations (Exh. A, Attachments 
1 and 2). 
Bell's brief assumes the preliminary projections in 
the pre-filed testimony of the witness Hinton: 37,610 
potential Bell lifeline customers (8% of 468,000 estimated 
residential lines); and 2,028 Contel customers (20% of 10,000 
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estimated residential lines). The projections were based on a 
lifeline program proposed preliminarily, which was modified 
later. The agreed final projections were based upon different 
pricing, more accurate line counts, census statistics, and 
experience in other states: Mountain Bell, 30,000 projected 
participants (6.38% of 470,153 residence lines); Contel, 1,014 
projected participants (7.85% of 12,918 residence lines). See 
Attachments 1 and 2 to Exh. A (R 643). 
Bell grossly overstates the percentage difference. 
The point of this correction is that the customer lifeline 
participation is virtually identical in the two companies. 
This means that the "subsidy" portion of the 18 cents that Bell 
complains about is so small that it can scarcely be measured, 
given the difference in the size of the two companies. The 
matter is discussed below in Point IV. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The standard-of-review precedent (the Utah Dept. 
case) accords judicial deference to the decision below on the 
Court's intermediate review standard: the test is whether the 
decision falls within the limits of reasonableness or 
rationality. 
Bell argues (Point I) that this is a Commission 
decision construing general law, to be accorded no judicial 
deference. 
As Bell itself says, the theory of its appeal is a 
theory of rate discrimination. A resolution of that claim 
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depends upon the validity of the customer classifications made, 
and the Commission's application of special utilities statutes 
in specific pricing situations. The intermediate review 
standard governs that kind of case. Utah Dept. so holds. 
Bell's appeal fails unless it can show irrationality below. 
2. Mountain Bell's appeal states a special theory of 
statutory construction. The theory asserts that the Commission 
has no authority except what can be found in a "specific" 
statutory delegation; the theory goes even further to assert 
that a specific delegation constitutes also the denial of any 
other authority in relation to the subject matter involved. 
The second part of the theory rests upon the maxim expressio 
vmiytg est exciygip aiterivs* 
The specific-statute part of Bell's theory is not 
supported by any cited case and is contrary to much settled 
authority. An exact precedent (Rio Grande Motor) rejects the 
expressio-unius part of the argument. Bell's brief does not 
mention Rio Grande Motor. 
The statutory construction principles stated in many 
cases establish that a section of the utilities statutes is to 
be construed by a reading in relation to other sections, in 
relation to legislative purpose, and where useful in relation 
to legislative history. Because Bell's statutory construction 
argument is erroneous, its rate discrimination claim (wholly 
based on its construction theory) is without any foundation. 
3. The basic elements of the lifeline program 
(pricing, administration) are clearly within Commission 
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authority. Bell does not argue otherwise/ and indeed supports 
the program as Hcompletely reasonable." The disputed surcharge 
pooling element is one necessarily interrelated element, 
dictated by the program's logic and its legal rationalization. 
Bell's appeal, which concedes all of the program's factual and 
theoretical validity but then singles out for attack only that 
one element/ defeats itself. 
4. Bell's demonstration that the Commission can not 
levy taxes has no consequence. The problem of this appeal is 
whether the rate classifications that impose and distribute the 
surcharges are rational. That is an ordinary ratemaking 
problem/ and taxation has nothing to do with it. 
5. The Commission ruled that surcharge pooling is an 
essential and interrelated element of the lifeline program. If 
the pooling element falls then the entire program falls. 
The Court has held that its review authority extends 
only to the correction of Commission error and# where 
appropriate, to a remand for further Commission action. The 
Court would not have authority to order a continuation of this 
lifeline program without its surcharge pooling element. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UNDER THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW, THE 
COURT NEED DETERMINE ONLY WHETHER THE RULING AS 
TO SURCHARGE POOLING IS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF 
REASONABLENESS OR RATIONALITY. 
Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Public Service Com'n, 
658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983) analyzes the kinds of Commission 
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decisions brought to the Court for review, and identifies three 
categories accorded different levels of judicial deference to 
regulatory expertise. The review standards are: 
(a) No judicial deference is accorded a Commission 
decision that only interprets general law; the decision is 
corrected if it is in error. 
(b) Judicial deference is greatest where the 
Commission has found a fact; evidence "of any substance 
whatever" is sufficient to support such a finding. 
(c) An intermediate standard of deference is accorded 
in a variety of cases, including conclusions as to mixed 
law-and-fact problems, "reasonableness," questions of 
special law, and the like. To decisions of this kind the 
Court accords a measure of deference described in the 
decisions in various ways, all of which (Utah Dept. says) 
are " . . . variations of the idea that the Commission's 
decision must fall within the limits of reasonableness or 
rationality." 658 P.2d 601, 610. 
Bell says that this case raises only the issue whether 
the Commission has authority to order the pooling of surcharges 
among more than one carrier, and that a decision as to that is 
a decision about general law to be reviewed without any 
deference to the Commission. 
Mountain 3611*s own Point III identifies the subject 
matter (ratemaking) of the regulatory authority implicated 
here, but claims an invalid exercise of it. Its theory for 
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this case is that the multi-company classification of customers 
paying the surcharge, and the multi-company pooling, operate 
discriminatorily as against Bell's customers. That is a rate 
discrimination case. Its resolution turns upon the validity of 
the customer classifications made by the Commission. Mountain 
States Legal Fn. v. Utah Pub. Serv., 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981), 
reviewed the validity of classifications made to establish an 
electricity lifeline rate, and the funding mechanism. That was 
an intermediate-deference review, Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. 
Public Service Com'n, 658 P.2d 601, 611 n 17 (1983). This case 
is identical in kind. 
The closest precedent for the Bell argument is 
Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Com'n, 682 P.2d 858 (Utah 
1984), a judicial review conducted on the no-deference 
standard. Kearns-Tribune held that the Commission had no 
authority to adopt a rule that required a gas utility to put in 
its advertising a "tagline" identifying the source of the 
payment for the advertising. The Court examined the public 
utilities code and found no statute conferring any authority to 
regulate utility advertising, or even referring to the 
subject. This case is distinguishable by the clear presence of 
a regulatory subject matter, which Bell itself defines. Bell's 
reliance upon Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Public Service 
Com'n, 658 P.2d 601 (it quotes only a selected and isolated 
passage, Bell brief p 10-11) is obviously misplaced. The 
judicial review there was an intermediate-standard review. 
Id., 658 P.2d 601, 612. 
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To succeed here, Mountain Bell must show that the 
classification process resulting in the surcharge pooling is 
irrational. 
II. THE COMMISSION IS AUTHORIZED BY THE UTILITIES 
STATUTES TO FUND THE TELEPHONE LIFELINE PROGRAM 
THROUGH A POOLING OF LIFELINE SURCHARGES. 
Mountain Bell does not dispute the Commission's 
authority to implement a telephone lifeline program and to 
provide for funding of the program through its ratemaking 
power. Mountain Bell objects only to the particular form of 
funding chosen. (Bell brief pp 5, 23-24) However/ the 
Commission has ample authority under the utilities statutes to 
require joint or pooled funding of a jointly provided service 
such as telephone access at lifeline rates. 
The Commission's general statutory authority to 
regulate public utilities and the services they provide is 
found in § 54-4-1: 
The commission is hereby vested with power and 
jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public 
utility in this state, and to supervise all of the 
business of every such public utility in this state, 
and to do all things, whether herein specifically 
designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary 
or convenient in the exercise of such power and 
jurisdiction . . . . [Emp. added.] 
Thus, the Commission need not be expressly authorized to do 
every specific act it undertakes. It is sufficient if the 
challenged act is "necessary or convenient* to the exercise of 
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the general power. See, e.g., Utah Power and Light Co, v. 
Public Serv. Com'n, 712 P.2d 251 (Utah 1985). 
Section 54-4-1 must be read and construed with other 
statutes expressly authorizing the Commission to regulate 
public utility rates. For example, § 54-3-1 requires that 
rates be "just and reasonable," which is defined to include 
consideration of the '•economic impact of charges on each 
category of customer." That section also mandates that all 
public utility equipment and facilities be maintained and 
utilized "as will be in all respects adequate, efficient, just 
and reasonable." Section 54-4-4 empowers the Commission to 
monitor and maintain "just and reasonable" rates by order. See 
also § 54-4-7 (authorizing the Commission to prescribe rules 
requiring public utilities to perform services at the rates and 
on the conditions provided in the rules). In addition, §§ 
54-4-8, 54-4-12, and 54-4-13 authorize the Commission to fix 
joint rates for jointly provided services and to fix the 
proportion of costs to be borne by each public utility. 
Construed together, these statutes authorize the Commission to 
fund the telephone lifeline program through a pooling of 
surcharges. See generally Mountain States Legal Fn. v. Utah 
Pub. Serv., 636 P.2d 1047, 1055-57 (Utah 1981). 
Specifically, the evidence presented at the hearings 
supports the Commission's findings and conclusions that pooling 
of lifeline surcharges is both necessary and convenient to 
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adoption and proper functioning of the lifeline program. 
Witnesses for the independent telephone companies testified 
that customers of those companies "would have to pay a 
substantially higher rate than Mountain Bell customers to fund 
Lifeline service." (R 686). Moreover, the evidence showed 
that the independent companies "have a higher percentage of 
subscribers who qualify for the Lifeline service, leaving a 
lesser percentage of non-lifeline ratepayers to pay for the 
program at substantially higher rates." (R 686). The 
Commission found: 
Based upon that testimony and other evidence presented 
to us in our rulemaking hearing on this matter, we 
concluded that it would be unjust and unreasonable to 
impose the Lifeline program on a company-specific 
basis as Mountain Bell proposed, because the 
Independents would be forced to so dramatically 
increase the rates charged to their non-lifeline 
subscribers as to make the program unworkable. We 
concluded that there was no other alternative 
mechanism to fund the Lifeline * program than through 
the pooling of funds. [R 686; Bell Add., Exh. E, emp. 
added.] 
Thus, because the lifeline program is rendered 
unworkable without a pooling of surcharges, pooling is 
authorized by § 54-4-1 as "necessary and convenient" in the 
exercise of the Commission's power to implement the lifeline 
program. 
Pooling, as a prerequisite of the lifeline program, is 
also appropriate to the goal of universal service and to 
maintain efficient utilization of equipment and facilities as 
required by § 54-3-1. The principles underlying universal 
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service and the enhancement of the phone system by the 
connection of additional customers, and the adverse 
consequences if customers are forced to drop off the system by 
higher charges, are described in the testimony (e.g., Hinton (R 
10-15)) and further discussed in Point III below. Universal 
service is necessary for efficient utilization of the phone 
system; the lifeline program is necessary to achieve universal 
service; and pooling of surcharges is required to fund the 
lifeline program. (See Commission findings on the benefits of 
universal service, R 646-47; Bell Add., Exh. C.) 
In sum, the Commission is authorized to impose a 
pooled rate to fund the lifeline program, and thereby advance 
the industry toward universal service and enhance the value and 
efficiency of the telephone system. 
Bell statutory construction argument 
Mountain Bell's appeal depends upon its special view 
about the way the sections of the utilities code are to be 
read. It is argued that Commission authority '•must derive from 
a specific statute"; the argument goes on to assert that a 
delegation of such authority precludes any other authority 
within that subject matter. Reliance for the second part of 
the theory is placed upon a maxim, expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius (the translation supplied is "the expression of one 
thing is the exclusion of another"). We are told that 
expressio unius "is the law in Utah" (Bell brief p 21). 
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(1) The specific-statute-only argument 
Mountain Bell begins (Bell brief IIA# p 11) with the 
generalization that the Commission, a creature of statute, has 
only such powers as the statutes grant or imply. The argument 
proceeds that § 54-4-1, the broad authority statute, does not 
"invest the Commission with unbridled discretion" to do 
"anything it believes in the public interest." Interwest Corp, 
v. Public Service Commission, 510 P.2d 919 (Utah 1973), Basin 
Flying Service v, Pyfrlic Service Commission, 531 P.2d 1303 
(Utah 1975), and Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Com'n, 682 
P.2d 858 (Utah 1984), are cited. 
Of course no one considers that the Commission has 
unbridled discretion to do whatever it deems in the public 
interest. The truism that § 54-4-1 does not do that has no 
logical connection with what Bell purports to deduce: that the 
Commission has no authority at all except what a "specific" 
statute delegates. If by this Bell means that every broadly 
phrased statute must be read out of the utilities code 
(respondents take this to be the implication of the argument), 
then no authority supports the deduction and Bell cites none. 
The fallacy of the specific-statute-only part of 
Bell's statutory construction theory is shown in White River 
Shale Oil v. Pub. Serv. Com'n, 700 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Utah 1985): 
The provisions of the entire Public Utilities 
Act, U.C.A., 1953 §§ 54-1-1 to -11-10 (1974 & Supp. 
1983), must be considered in determining whether there 
are sufficient guidelines established by the 
legislature. However, the primary sources of guidance 
are the declarations of legislative goals and policies 
which an agency is to apply when exercising its 
delegated powers. 
These declarations need only be as specific as 
the circumstances warrant. The legislature need not 
lay down a detailed and specific set of guidelines 
which covers every conceivable problem that might 
arise in implementing the legislation. It is 
sufficient if there are general policies and standards 
articulated which provide direction to an 
administrative body possessing the expertise to adapt 
the legislative goals to varying circumstances. 
(2) Expressip Vnius 
The second part of Bell's statutory construction 
argument depends upon the expressio-unius maxim and three 
cases2 that employ it as a construction aid. The argument from 
the maxim is that a specific delegation of authority means also 
that the Commission has no other authority in relation to the 
subject matter treated. 
The identical argument was made, and the Court 
squarely rejected it, in Rio Grande Motorway, Inc. v. Public 
Service Com'n, 21 Utah 2d 377, 445 P.2dx990, 991-2 (1968): 
The plaintiffs' argument is that inasmuch as the 
legislature expressly granted the Commission power to 
grant temporary operating authority to contract 
carriers, by implication, it precluded the issuance of 
such authority to common motor carriers. This is 
based on Sec. 54-6-10, U.C.A. 1953: 
The commission shall have power, without a 
hearing, to issue temporary, seasonal or 
emergency permits to contract motor carriers in 
intrastate commerce, . . . . Such permits and 
licenses may be issued upon such information, 
application or request therefor, as the 
commission may prescribe . . . . but in no event 
2
 Hansen v. Wilkinson, 658 P.2d 1216 (Utah 1983); Cannon v. 
Gardner, 611 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1980); and Olympia Sales Co. v. 
Long, 604 P.2d 919 (Utah 1979). 
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shall any temporary, seasonal or emergency permit or 
license be issued for a period of time greater than 
sizty days in length • . . . 
Reliance is placed upon the maxim "expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius." It is appreciated that 
the maxim is sometimes helpful in determining the 
meaning of an otherwise questionable statute. But its 
only usefulness is for that purpose: as a rule of 
construction. It has no force of law; and it has no 
proper application when its effect would be to 
obstruct rather than to carry out the purpose of the 
statute. It has been aptly said that it is "a 
valuable servant, but a dangerous master." Whether it 
is helpful in understanding the intended effect of a 
statute depends upon an anlysis of the legislative 
enactment to which it is sought to be applied. It is 
therefore appropriate to look to the provisions and 
purposes of the statutes relating to enfranchising and 
regulating motor carriers. [Interior citations 
omitted.] 
Bell's brief omits any reference to the decision. 
The statutory construction precedents 
The fallacy of Bell's statutory construction argument 
emerges even more clearly when viewed in the light of the 
statutory construction principles taught in the decisions 
construing the utilities code. Some of the recent cases are: 
Rio Grande Motorway, Inc. v. Public Service ConTn 21 Utah 2d 
377, 445 P.2d 990 (1968) (statutes read in relation to other 
statutes, and in relation to legislative purpose and history); 
Mountain States Legal Fn. v. Utah Pub. Serv., 636 P.2d 1047, 
1055 (Utah 1981) (examines and applies unexpressed, but 
logically necessary, relation of § 54-3-1 (just and reasonable 
rates) to § 54-3-8 (non-discriminatory rates)); Kearns-Tribune 
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. ConTn, 682 P.2d 858 (Utah 1984) (operation 
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of broadly stated § 54-4-1 narrowed by examination of utilities 
code showing entire absence of any reference to subject sought 
to be regulated) Big K Corp. v. Public Service Com'n, 689 P..2d 
1349, 1355 (Utah 1984) (general term "public convenience and 
necessity" in former § 54-6-5 (1973 Code) construed as 
fostering motor carrier competition when feasible, a 
construction determined not inconsistent with provision in 
former § 54-6-4 against "unnecessary duplication" of service); 
Utah Deptt Qt PU5t Reqt v> PvfrUc Service Cpm'n, 720 P.2d 420, 
423 (Utah 1986) (limitation upon general § 54-4-1 authority, 
and upon the interim ratemaking authority of § 54-7-12(3)(d), 
by other sections permitting prospective rates only); and White 
River sheie Oil vf Pyfr, Serv, ConTh, 700 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Utah 
1985) (reach of general authority in § 54-4-1 to issue orders, 
and authority in § 54-7-4.5 to issue cease-and-desist orders, 
construed by reference to declarations of legislative goals and 
policies, and to Constitution). 
Analogy of toll PQplinq 
An obvious problem for Mountain Bell is that it must 
explain away the analogy between the surcharge pooling it 
attacks here and the long-accepted industry practice of pooling 
intrastate toll revenues. 
Bell would distinguish the two pools this way (Bell 
brief pp 19-22): it says toll pooling is authorized by 
§ 54-4-12, which mandates the interconnections of the 
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facilities of the telephone carriers. Bell would differentiate 
the toll pooling there authorized from surcharge pooling by an 
exoressio unius reading of § 54-4-12: toll service is -jointly 
provided," so a pooling of toll revenues is authorized by the 
"physical connection between the two companies relating to the 
provision of such service." In claimed distinction, lifeline 
service ". . .is not a jointly provided service"; it is local 
and involves only one carrier. 
There is no such distinction. Toll service can of 
course involve an inter-company connection of facilities, but 
that is not necessarily the case and as to most Utah toll calls 
it is not the case. The revenues of the many toll calls 
totally switched, carried, and terminated by Mountain Bell are 
pooled; in the same way, the revenues of a call wholly handled 
by Contel are also pooled. The pool is divided among the 
intrastate companies without any reference to participation in 
any particular call. 
The statutory basis for toll pooling is the same as 
that for the surcharge pooling ordered in this case; it lies in 
the Legislature's mandate that the telephone carriers 
interconnect their facilities, and the statutes that empower 
the Commission to regulate two or more carriers together and to 
apportion their costs where appropriate. The legislative 
purpose is stated, and the authority is delegated, in § 
54-4-12, which Bell seeks to avoid, and in other sections Bell 
does not mention: e.g., § 54-4-8 (Commission can require 
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additions, or extensions, "by any public utility, or any two or 
more public utilities," with provision for common regulation 
and apportionment of cost); § 54-4-13(1) (ordered joint use of 
facilities); § 54-3-1 (charges made "by any public utility, or 
by any two or more" utilities shall be just and reasonable); 
and § 54-3-4 (provision for joint tariffs and concurrences). 
Toll pooling is a practical construction of these 
statutes: common regulation of more than one carrier is 
authorized in an appropriate case. This statutory construction 
by the industry and the regulator has the force of having been 
in place for a long time. The identical statutory construction 
authorizes surcharge pooling. 
The statutes referred to in the discussion above 
construed in accordance with the decisions, fully support the 
conclusion that surcharge pooling is authorized. 
III. THE LIFELINE RULE, INCLUDING ITS POOLED SURCHARGE 
FUNDING ELEMENT, IS A VALID EXERCISE OF 
COMMISSION AUTHORITY. 
Mountain Bell's Point III identifies ratemaking as the 
source of the regulatory authority exercised here, but argues 
that surcharge pooling is an improper exercise of that 
authority. Because the argument isolates the surcharge pooling 
element, it fails to consider that element in its relation to 
the whole program. Limited by this approach, the Bell brief 
omits any reference to the Commission's conclusions about 
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telephone subscription in low income households and about 
customer drop-off, and does not refer in any way to the 
consequences of those factors for the policy of universal 
telephone service. 
Universal service 
The goal of universal service reflects a special 
characteristic of telecommunications. Apart from the 
generalization that any utility system (gas, telephone, 
electric) is bettered by the connection of additional customers 
(within limits, economies of scale lower unit costs), a 
telephone system is improved in a different way when additional 
connections are achieved: each telephone in the network can 
reach additional telephones. Customer drop-off has opposite 
consequences: not only does it threaten stranded plant (thus 
raising costs of service) but also it diminishes the usefulness 
of the instruments remaining in the network. 
Universal service is defined by the Commission as 
". . . the offering of affordable telephone service to as many 
of the citizens of the State as possible" (Exh. A; R 647 1f 
3). 3 As the Commission noted, universal service has the 
3
 The Wyoming Commission has stated a like definition (AT&T 
Communications of the Mountain States, Inc., 61 PUR 4th 102, 
Wyo. PSC 7/16/84: "The clear purpose of Wyoming public utility 
statutes is universal service; i.e., the availability of 
utility service at just and reasonable rates to all the Wyoming 
public.") 
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approval of the Congress4 and the FCC. A much-quoted 
formulation is stated in one of the divestiture decisions, 
United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc.. 569 F. Supp. 990, 997 
(DCDC 1983): 
". . • the goal of universal service . . . [is] 
the goal of providing affordable telephone service to 
all, including those who are not affluent or who 
reside in relatively isolated areas. 
(The court's related note (p 997 n 32) is: -E.g., in 
some of the western and midwestern states, where the 
cost of providing service far exceeds that of 
connecting up telephones in densely-populated 
cities 
ting 
. - ) 5 
4
 The reference is to Section 1 of the Communications Act 
of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 151): The Acfs -purpose" is ". . .to 
make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the 
United States . . . communication service with adequate 
facilities at reasonable charges . . ." 
5
 The court stated the universal service definition in 
connection with an expression of irritation at the FCC's CALC 
(569 F.Supp 990, 997-8): 
. . . If the objective of telephone service 
available at reasonable rates to all is not to be 
jeopardized, it is therefore most important that local 
rates not be burdened by unnecessary increases. As 
the Court repeatedly pointed out in its August 11, 
1982, Opinion (especially in connection with the 
discussion of the access charge issue (see infra)) 
there is no legitimate basis for using the 
reorganization of the Bell System as a means for 
undermining the universal service objective or as an 
excuse for raising local rates. 
The Court has therefore noted with considerable 
surprise and some dismay that the Federal 
Communications Commission, far from using the access 
charge tool as a means for easing the burdens on the 
(Footnote 5 continued on next page.) 
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Mountain Bell's brief does not face up to the 
implications of the Commission's universal service reasoning. 
If the lifeline program is supportable because it benefits the 
telephone network as a network, and avoids drop-off damage to 
the network (Bell says it supports all this), then that 
reasoning refutes the Bell argument that the funding mechanism 
must be kept "company specific." 
Cl9SSifiC9tiQn 
The precedent governing this surcharge pooling issue 
is Mountain States Legal Fn. v. Utah Pub. Serv., 636 P.2d 1047 
(Utah 1981). The Court there held that a lifeline rate is not 
per se unlawful, but that in that instance the Commission had 
exercised its authority erroneously. Its general findings 
about electricity usage by senior citizens and that group's 
ability to pay, supplied no explanation for the exclusion of 
(Footnote 5 continued.) 
users of local telephone service, has opted instead, 
in a major decision issued since the Court's approval 
of the consent decree, to saddle the local subscribers 
with the access costs of interexchange carriers, 
[citations omitted] 
Concern about CALC-caused damage to universal service prompted 
the Joint Board's CALC-waiver recommendation to the FCC. The 
same concern partly underlies the Commission action under 
review here. 
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others from the lowered rate classification, nor any 
explanation why the shortfall burden was borne by a class 
including some, but not all, of the other ratepayers. 
Mountain Bell says nothing about the classification 
analysis that is the essence of Mountain States. The opinion 
analyzes the interrelationship of two rate statutes: § 54-3-1 
mandates "just and reasonable" utility rates, and supplies a 
definition of that term; § 54-3-8 forbids a rate that grants a 
preference or subjects anyone to disadvantage. 
The relevant sentences of § 54-3-1 are: 
All charges made, demanded or received by any 
public utility, or by any two or more public 
utilities, for any product or commodity furnished or 
to be furnished, or for any service rendered or to be 
rendered, shall be just and reasonable. . . • The 
scope of definition "just and reasonable" may include, 
but shall not be limited to, the cost of providing 
service to each category of customer, economic impact 
of charges on each category of customer, and on the 
well-being of the State of Utah; methods of reducing 
wide periodic variations in demand of such products, 
commodities or services, and means of encouraging 
conservation of resources and energy. 
Section 54-3-8 provides: 
No public utility shall, as to rates, charges, 
service, facilities or in any other respect, make or 
grant any preference or advantage to any person, or 
subject any person to any prejudice or disadvantage. 
No public utility shall establish or maintain any 
unreasonable difference as to rates, charges, service 
or facilities, or in any other respect, either as 
between localities or as between classes of service. 
The commission shall have power to determine any 
question of fact arising under this section. 
Mountain States holds that the just-and-reasonable standards of 
§ 54-3-1 may be considered to determine whether there is a § 
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54-3-8 preference. The conclusion is drawn not from the 
specific language of § 54-3-8 but from the interior logic, and 
the practical operation, of the sections taken together (636. 
P.2d 1047, 1055): 
Although the legislature did not amend the 
preference statute, § 54-3-8, it necessarily follows 
that the standards stated in § 54-3-1 must be 
considered, at least to some extent, in determining 
whether a rate accorded one group of consumers is 
preferential. It would be impossible to give proper 
force and effect to the stautory standards in the rate 
of return section if the Commission could not deal 
with classes of customers which have common 
characteristics based on those standards. 
Further, 636 P.2d 1047, 1055: 
. . . It is discriminations with no rational 
basis, and discriminations based on factors foreign to 
the regulatory scheme, which are aimed at by the 
preference statute. 
In terms of Bell's claim of rate discrimination here, Mountain 
States means that factors sufficient to^  justify multi-company 
lifeline pricing can serve also to justify a multi-company 
funding, if the explanation is rational. Surely the 
Commission's full and careful explanations in this record are 
sufficient to meet any claim of irrational rate discrimination 
in this case. 
The Mountain States opinion also describes, in a way 
directly applicable here, the classification process in 
ratemaking (636 P.2d 1047, 1052-3): 
Classification of customers must necessarily be 
accomplished by reference to general characteristics 
having some rational nexus with the criteria used for 
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determining just and reasonable rates. Whether cost 
of service, value of service, or other criteria are 
used, either alone or in conjunction with each other, 
classifications of persons must be on the basis of 
similar — but not identical — characteristics. Were 
it not so, the PSC would have to establish individual 
rates for each customer — a wholly uneconomic and 
impracticable, if not impossible, task. Moreover, no 
matter what classifications may be established, the 
disciplines of accounting and economics are not so 
precise, or so unified on cost allocation theories or 
the proper theoretical foundations for rate making 
generally, as to agree on all the relevant factors and 
standards to be considered in arriving at rates and 
classifications acknowledged to be equitable. Beyond 
that, there are broad public policy issues, whether 
implicitly or explicitly recognized, which are 
necessarily affected by whatever classifications of 
customers are recognized. 
This decision to pool the surchages is valid ratemaking. 
IV. THE SURCHARGE POOLING IS NOT A TAX. 
Mountain Bellfs Point IV (Bell brief pp 27-28) 
demonstrates, at some length, that the Commission is without 
taxing authority, and goes on to argue that because the 
surcharge distribution is a "tax" ("the enforced contribution 
by Bell customers to subsidize non-Bell customers") it is 
unlawful. Bell says: " . . . once the Commission required 
Mountain Bell customers to subsidize Lifeline customers in 
other companies (i.e., once the subsidy flowed beyond the 
boundaries of Mountain Bell's service territory), the 
Commission crossed the boundary between appropriate ratemaking 
and illegal taxation." (Bell brief p 29). 
The correction of Bell's purported comparison of 
relative lifeline participations (part 2 of factual statement, 
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p. 8 above) shows how insignificant in practical terms the 
HsubsidyH really is. It is even more trifling if account is 
taken of the "subsidy* accruing back to Bell's customers 
through the 20% portion of the pool funded by the surcharges on 
intrastate tolls, and access charges on alternate carriers, all 
of which Bell ignores. 
"Subsidy" (to employ Bell's term) is inherent in any 
telephone rate structure, including Bell's: Bell's toll 
callers subsidize (or are subsidized by) the multi-company toll 
pool; Bell's non-lifeline customers subsidize its lifeline 
customers; the Bell customer who lives close to the exchange 
switch subsidizes the remote customer served at many times the 
cost. All of this is inherent in ratemaking, Mountain States 
Legal Fn. v. Utah Pub. Serv., 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981), and 
"taxation" has nothing to do with any of it. 
The Commission very properly and reasonably weighed 
the minor imbalances of the surcharge pooling contributions as 
against the plainly unworkable imbalance of burden upon the 
non-lifeline customers of the much smaller independent carriers 
that would have resulted if a company-specific lifeline funding 
had been employed. 
By way of suggesting that the Commission decision not 
to impose the surcharge on the non-lifeline customers of the 
non-participating carriers was based upon a "taxation" theory, 
Bell submits the footnoted comment that it is "fairly obvious . 
. . [that] to do so would clearly go beyond the Commission's 
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ratemaking power into the area of illegal taxation. There is 
no practical or legal distinction . . ." (Bell brief p 30 n 11). 
Putting to one side the problem whether Bell has 
standing to raise the point (and, indeed, the whole appeal -
after all, none of the surcharge money is Bell's; it is 
ratepayer money; Bell's revenue losses and all its costs are 
reimbursed totally), the distinction between the carriers is 
obvious. The Commission concluded that the reasons for the 
lifeline rule (concerns about subscriber penetration and 
drop-off) were not applicable to carriers having a local rate 
below the $9.45 lifeline rate it chose, a conclusion that can 
scarcely be called irrational. The record (Hinton R 19) 
supports the conclusion. 
Mountain Bell's taxation point has no merit. 
V. THE CONSEQUENCE OF A JUDICIAL VACATION OF 
SURCHARGE POOLING WOULD BE THE VACATION OF THE 
LIFELINE PROGRAM IN ITS ENTIRETY. 
Mountain Bell asks the Court (Bell brief p 30) to set 
aside only the pooling of the lifeline surcharges and, 
presumably, to leave the rest of the program (which Bell 
supports) alone. 
If the assumption of that prayer is that the Lifeline 
Rules could continue intact and effective without surcharge 
pooling then it ignores the essential interrelationship of the 
lowered rate and its funding mechanism. The program will not 
work without the pooling, and the Commission explicitly so 
concluded (R 686). 
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The review authority conferred on the Court has been 
held to have limits: the Court can affirm the Commission, or 
it can set aside an erroneous action and remand a matter; in 
this instance it would be without authority to rewrite a 
program the elements of which are as interrelated as these 
are. § 54-7-16; Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public 
Service Com'n, 107 Utah 502, 155 P.2d 104; on rehearing 107 
Utah 530, 158 P.2d 935; Salt Lake Transfer Company v. Public 
Service Com'n, 11 U.2d 121, 355 P.2d 706 (1960). If the 
surcharge pooling falls as Mountain Bell demands then the whole 
program falls too. 
CONCLUSION 
Mountain Bell's review petition should be denied. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 (1986 Repl. Vol. 6A) 
54-3-1. Charges must be just; service adequate; rules rea-
sonable. 
All charges made, demanded or received by any public utility, or by any two 
or more public utilities, for any product or commodity furnished or to be 
furnished, or for any service rendered or to be rendered, shall be just and 
reasonable. Every uqjust or unreasonable charge made, demanded or received 
for such product or commodity or service is hereby prohibited and declared 
unlawful. Every public utility shall furnish, provide and maintain such ser-
vice, instrumentalities, equipment and facilities as will promote the safety, 
health, comfort and convenience of its patrons, employees and the public, and 
as will be in all respects adequate, efficient, just and reasonable. All rules and 
regulations made by a public utility affecting or pertaining to its charges or 
service to the public shall be just and reasonable. The scope of definition j^ust 
and reasonable" may include, but shall not be limited to, the cost of providing 
service to each category of customer, economic impact of charges on each 
category of customer, and on the well-being of the state of Utah; methods of 
reducing wide periodic variations in demand of such products, commodities or 
services, and means of encouraging conservation of resources and energy. 
64-3-4. Joint tariffs. 
The names of the several public utilities which are parties to any joint 
tariff, rate, fare, toll, contract, classification or charge shall be specified in the 
schedule or schedules showing the same. Unless otherwise ordered by the 
commission, a schedule showing such joint tariff, rate, toll, fare, contract, 
classification or charge need be filed with the commission by only one of the 
parties to it, provided there is also filed with the commission, in such form as 
the commission may require, a concurrence in such joint tariff, rate, toll, fare, 
contract, classification or charge by each of the other parties thereto. 
64-3-8. Preferences forbidden — Power of commission. 
No public utility shall, as to rates, charges, service, facilities or in any other 
respect, make or grant any preference or advantage to any person, or subject 
any person to any prejudice or disadvantage. No public utility shall establish 
or maintain any unreasonable difference as to rates, charges, service or facili-
ties, or in any other respect, either as between localities or as between classes 
of service. The commission shall have power to determine any question of fact 
arising under this section. 
64-4-1. General jurisdiction. 
The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise 
and regulate every public utility in this state, and to supervise all of the 
business of every such public utility in this state, and to do all things, whether 
herein specifically designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary or 
convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction; provided, however, 
that the department of transportation shall have jurisdiction over those safety 
functions transferred to it by the Department of Transportation Act. 
54-4-7. Rules, equipment, service — Regulation after hear-
ing. 
Whenever the commission shall find, after a hearing, that the rules, regula-
tions, practices, equipment, appliances, facilities, or service of any public util-
ity, or the methods of manufacture, distribution, transmission, storage or 
supply employed by it, are unjust, unreasonable, unsafe, improper, inade-
quate or insufficient, the commission shall determine the just, reasonable, 
safe, proper, adequate or sufficient rules, regulations, practices, equipment, 
appliances, facilities, service or methods to be observed, furnished, con-
structed, enforced or employed, and shall fix the same by its order, rule or 
regulation. The commission, after a hearing, shall prescribe rules and regula-
tions; for the performance of any service or the furnishing of any commodity of 
the character furnished or supplied by any public utility, and on proper de-
mand and tender of rates such public utility shall furnish such commodity or 
render such service within the time and upon the conditions provided in such 
rules. 
54-4-8. Improvements, extensions, repairs — Regulations 
— Apportioning costs. 
Whenever the commission shall find that additions, extensions, repairs or 
improvements to or changes in the existing plant, equipment, apparatus, fa-
cilities or other physical property of any public utility or of any two or more 
public utilities ought reasonably to be made, or that a new structure or struc-
tures ought to be erected to promote the security or convenience of its em-
ployees or the public or in any way to secure adequate service or facilities, the 
commission shall make and serve an order directing that such additions, 
extensions, repairs, improvements or changes be made or such structure or 
structures be erected in the manner and within the time specified in said 
order. If any additions, extensions, repairs, improvements or changes, or any 
new structure or structures which the commission has ordered to be erected, 
require joint action by two or more public utilities, the commission shall 
notify the said public utilities that such additions, extensions, repairs, im-
provements or changes, or new structure or structures have been ordered, and 
that the same shall be made at their joint cost; whereupon the said public 
utilities shall have such reasonable time as the commission may grant within 
which to agree upon the portion or division of cost of such additions, exten-
sions, repairs, improvements or changes or any new structure or structures 
which each shall bear. If at the expiration of such time such public facilities 
shall fail to file with the commission a statement that an agreement has been 
made for division or apportionment of the cost or expense of such additions, 
extensions, repairs, improvements or changes, or of such new structure or 
structures, the commission shall have authority, after further hearing, to 
make an order fixing the proportion of such cost or expense to be borne by 
each public utility and the manner in which the same shall be paid or secured. 
54-4-12. Telegraph and telephone — Connections — Joint 
rates — Division. 
Whenever the commission shall find, after a hearing, that a physical con-
nection can reasonably be made between the lines of two or more telephone 
corporations, or two or more telegraph corporations, whose lines can be made 
to form a continuous line of communication by the construction and mainte-
nance of suitable connections for the transfer of messages or conversations, 
and that public convenience and necessity will be subserved thereby, or shall 
find that two or more telegraph or telephone corporations have failed to estab-
lish joint rates, tolls or charges for service by or over their said lines and that 
joint rates, tolls or charges ought to be established, the commission may, by 
its order, require that such connection be made, except where the purpose of 
such connection is primarily to secure the transmission of local messages or 
conversations between points within the same city or town, and that conversa-
tions be transmitted and messages transferred over such connections under 
such rules and regulations as the commission may establish and prescribe, 
and that through lines and joint rates, tolls and charges be made and be used, 
observed and be in force in the future. If such telephone or telegraph corpora-
tions do not agree upon the division between themselves of the cost of such 
physical connection or connections, or upon the division of the joint rates, tolls 
or charges established by the commission over such through lines, the com-
mission shall have authority, after a further hearing, to establish such divi-
sion by supplemental order. 
54-4-13. Joint use of properties by utilities — Adjustment 
of costs — Cable television easement rights. 
(1) Whenever the commission shall find that public convenience and neces-
sity require the use by one public utility of the conduits, subways, tracks, 
wires, poles, pipes or other equipment, or any part thereof, on, over or under 
any street or highway, belonging to another public utility, and that such use 
will not result in irreparable injury to the owner or other users of such con-
duits, subways, tracks, wires, poles, pipes or other equipment, or in any sub-
stantial detriment to the service, and that such public utilities have failed to 
agree upon such use or the terms and conditions or compensation for the 
same, the commission may, by order, direct that such use be permitted, and 
prescribe a reasonable compensation and reasonable terms and conditions for 
the joint use. If such use is directed, the public utility to whom the use is 
permitted shall be liable to the owner or other users of such conduits, 
subways, tracks, wires, poles, pipes or other equipment for such damage as 
may result therefrom to the property of such owner or other users thereof. 
(2) Whenever a public utility including its successors, assigns, lessees, li-
censees and agents, is granted a right-of-way easement to construct, operate, 
maintain or remove utility facilities, electric power and other facilities as it 
may require upon, over, under and across land or upon, over, under and across 
a dedicated public utility strip, and such public utility has also entered into a 
pole attachment contract with a cable television company which has been 
granted a franchise by a city, county, municipal or other public authority 
including the right to use the wires, conduits, cables, or poles of such public 
utility, and providing for the attachment or installation of wires, cables, and 
other equipment of a cable television company, to certain poles or in certain 
conduits of such public utility under controlled conditions designed to ensure 
the continued safe operation of the utilities service and facilities without any 
additional burden on the grantor's property then, and in that event, the cable 
television company, has the right to share in and enjoy the use of the right-of-
way easement, subject to the terms and conditions provided in the pole attach-
ment contract, and the right-of-way easement or interest granted the public 
utility is apportionable to the cable television company under the following 
limitations or conditions: 
(a) Consent is secured from the private property owner where the ease-
ment is located except this requirement shall not apply in the case of a 
dedicated public utility strip. 
(b) The public service commission determines that under the terms and 
conditions of the pole attachment contract the use of the utilities facilities 
by the cable television company will not interfere with the primary util-
ity function or render its facilities unsafe, and that the contract is in the 
public interest. 
(c) The right-of-way easement is not restricted to the sole use of the 
public utility; provided, that such restriction shall not apply in any ease-
ment granted for the use of a dedicated public utility strip. 
(d) The use contemplated by the cable television company is the same 
or similar to that granted the public utility and that such use will not 
impose an additional burden upon the servient tenement. 
(e) The use of the easement by the cablfe television company will not 
cause irreparable injury or damage to the grantor's property. 
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EXHIBIT B - December 17, 1986 Report and Order, 
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DO NOT REMOVE 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Rulemaking ) 
for the Establishment of Lifeline ) CASE NO, 85-999-13 
Telephone Service Rates for all ) 
Regulated Local Exchange Carriers ) STIPULATION 
in the State of Utah ) 
The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company 
(Mountain Bell), AT&T Communications of the Mountain States 
(AT&T), the Continental Telephone Company of the West (Contel), 
the Exchange Carriers of Utah, the Utah Division of Public 
Utilities (Division), the Utah State Committee of Consumer 
Services (Committee), the Salt Lake Area Community Action 
Program and Utah Issues, being all parties of record in the 
above captioned proceeding, hereby submit the following 
Stipulation to the Public Service Commission of Utah 
(Commission). 
1. All parties agree with the assumptions, estimates, 
data and calculations used to develop the 1987 annualized cost 
projections for lifeline telephone service provided by: (a) 
Beehive Telephone Company; (b) Contel; and (c) Mountain Bell; 
as presented in Attachments 1 thru 3. 
2. All parties request that the local exchange carriers 
required to provide lifeline telephone service be required to 
file tariff revisions, within twenty days of the date of the 
Commission's order in this matter, to implement a lifeline 
telephone service surcharge rate at $0.18 per access line 
(trunk) for non-lifeline subscribers. 
3. All parties agree with the assumptions, estimates, 
data and calculations used to develop the 1987 annualized cost 
projections for: (a) the Commission's administration of the 
lifeline telephone service surcharge revenue pool and the Utah 
Department of Social Service's administration of the lifeline 
telephone service eligibility and verification procedures; (b) 
the lifeline telephone service revenue requirement that should 
be recovered from the surcharges on intraLATA toll services and 
on intraLATA and interLATA switched access services (pursuant 
to the Commission's Rule, 20 percent of Section 2 (a)); and (c) 
the surcharge rate percentage for subscribers of intraLATA toll 
services and for intraLATA and interLATA switched access ser-
vices; as presented in Attachment 4. 
4. All parties request that all local exchange and intra-
state interexchange carriers regulated by the Commission be 
required to file tariff revisions, within twenty days of the 
date of the Commission's order in this matter, to implement 
lifeline telephone service surcharge rates based on: (a) 0.65 
ooofi2n 
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percent of the subscriber's monthly bill for intrastate intra-
LATA and interLATA message telecommunications (and optional 
toll) services (MTS) and wide area telecommunications service 
(WATS); and (b) 1.88 percent of the monthly bill for intrastate 
intraLATA and interLATA switched access services provided to 
resale carriers (Defined, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 
54-2-1 (30), as "any person which provides, on a resale basis, 
any telephone or telecommunication service which is purchased 
from a telephone corporation."). 
5. All parties agree that six months after the implemen-
tation date for the lifeline telephone service and the sur-
charge rates, and every six months thereafter, the Commission 
should conduct a proceeding to: 
(a) Review the local exchange carriers' semi-annual 
lifeline telephone service reports, filed pur-
suant to the Commission's rule; 
(b) Review the amount of surcharge revenues collected 
from non-lifeline local exchange service, MTS, 
WATS and access service subscribers during the 
preceding six months; 
(c) Review requests by local exchange carriers pro-
viding lifeline telephone service for payments 
from the surcharge revenue pool,* as presented in 
Attachment 5; 
(d) Review requests by the Commission and by the Utah 
Department of Social Services for payments from 
the surcharge revenue pool to cover their admin-
istrative costs associated with the lifeline 
telephone service program; 
(e) Receive surcharge revenue payments from interex-
change carriers regulated by the Commission and 
from local exchange carriers that do not provide 
lifeline telephone service, pursuant to the Com-
mission's rule, or which collect surcharge reve-
nues in excess their lifeline telephone service 
revenue requirement (see Attachment 5); 
(f) Review the local exchange carriers' projections 
of lifeline telephone service subscribers, reve-
nue requirements and surcharge revenues for the 
next six months. 
(g) Review actions by the State Legislature to in-
crease or decrease the funded portion of the 
Standard Needs Budget of the Utah Department of 




(h) Consider revisions in the level of the lifeline 
telephone service rate or the surcharge rates. 
6. The Division agrees that it will audit and review all 
filings by the local exchange carriers in the lifeline service 
summary review proceeding for accuracy and reasonableness. 
7. All parties agree that cost studies used by local 
exchange carriers to estimate their administrative and 
installation costs for lifeline telephone service will be 
furnished to the Commission thirty days prior to the first 
summary review proceeding and every two-years thereafter. 
8. All parties agree that any revisions in the local 
exchange carriers' rates for residential local exchange 
services, MTS, WATS or switched access services which would 
affect their lifeline telephone service revenue requirements or 
surcharge revenues should be accounted in the next lifeline 
service review proceeding. 
9. This Stipulation reflects agreement by all parties as 
to the procedures to administer the lifeline telephone service 
program as well as the initial lifeline telephone service sur-
charge rates. It does not in any way limit the right of any 
party to exercise all legal rights available to them, including 
the right to seek rehearing or review of the Commission's Rule 
or the Order ultimately adopted by the Commission or to appeal 
such Rule or Order if they so choose. 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of December, 1986. 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
*yjji 
Smith, Attorney Ted D. 
AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF THE 
MOUNTAIN STATES 
KlLUMi. p. CiGiJzS 
-4-
CONTINENTAL TELEPHONE COMPANY 
OF THE WEST 
By. 
t*s—\ qtrvyVjt^ 
John H. Horsley, Attorney 
EXCHANGE CARRIERS OF UTAH 
DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 
By ^ Uflf-^s) 
Brian W. Burnett 
Assistant Attorney General 
COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES 
M. Tanndr 
Assistant Attorney General 
SALT LAKE AREA COMMUNITY ACTION 
PROGRAM and UT^ lV ISSUES 
By. VJL 
Bruce M. Plenk, Attorney 
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Revenue loss from participating lifeline customers 
(current rate x participation x 12) (*4,726,800.00) 
Revenue gain from participating lifeline customers 
(lifeline rate x participation x 12) 
Nonrecurring Cost 
(cost x new hookups) 
Coversion Cost 
(cost x new exisiting) 
Nonrecurri ng revenues 
(1/2 rate x new hookups) 
Administrative Costs 
a) printing of notification letters 
b) business reply postage on 
questionnare 











)TAL COSTS DUE TO LIFELINE 
>7. of Total 
ircharge 
($1,476,700.00) 
1,476,700.00/580,205/12 = *0.21 
(*1,845,875.00) 
Attachment 2 
UTAH LIFELINE COSTS AND REVENUES 
CALCULATIONS 
Continental Telephone Company 
Participating Customers (50/i of 2,028 eligables) 1,014 est 
New Hookups 254 
New Exisitng Customers 760 
Residence Lines 12,918 
Nonlifeline Lines 12,158 
Business Lines Historical 
Current Rate *13.26 
Lifeline Rate * 9-45 
Nonrecurring Rate *44.00 
Nonrecurring Cost Cost Study *44.00 
Conversion Cost * 7.56 
1. Revenue loss -from participating lifeline customers 
(current rate x participation x 12) (# 161,348.00) 
Revenue gain from participating lifeline customers 
(lifeline rate x participation x 12) 114,988.00 
2. Nonrecurring Cost 
(cost x new hookups) ( 11,176.00) 
Coversion Cost 
(cost x new exisiting) ( 5,746.00) 
3. Nonrecurring revenues 
(1/2 rate x new hookups) 5,588.00 
4. Administrative Costs 
a) printing of notification letters 
b) business reply postage on 
questionnare 
c) publicity ( customer notification) 
d) other 
Total ( 9,982.00) 
TOTAL COSTS DUE TO LIFELINE (* 67,676.00) 
807. of Total (* 54,141.00) 
surcharge 54,141.00/ 12,158/ 12 » *0.37 
000625 
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UTAH LIFELINE COSTS AND REVENUES 
CALCULATIONS 
Beehive 
Parti ci pati ng Customers 
New Hookups 























1. Revenue loss from participating lifeline customers 
(current rate x participation x 12) (* 27,900.00) 
3. 
4. 
Revenue gain from participating lifeline customers 
(lifeline rate x participation x 12) 
Nonrecurring Cost 
(cost x new hookups) 
Coversion Cost 
(cost x new exisi ting) 
Nonrecurring revenues 
(1/2 rate x new hookups) 
Administrative Costs 
a) printing of notification letters 
b) business reply postage on 
questionnare 










TOTAL COSTS DUE TO LIFELINE 
807. of Total 
surcharge 
(S 7,622.00) 
7,622.00/ 200/12 • *3. 18 
(* 




TOLL & ACCESS SERVICES SURCHARGE 
TOTAL Intrastate Toll WATS and Access Revenues $72,346,725 
Lifeline Cost to be Covered by the Toll Surcharge 
Mountain Bell Costs 
Continental Costs 
Beehive Costs 















Toll, WATS and Access Surcharge 473,963/72,346,725 = .0066 
Weighted Amounts Individual Service Surcharge 
MTS & WATS .9987 X .0066 • .0065 
Access 2.849 X .0066 - .0188 
000627 
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w Exisitng Customers 
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nlifeline Lines 




>nrecurring Cost Cost Study 
inversion Cost 
Revenue loss from participating lifeline customers 
(current rate x participation x 12) 
Revenue gain from participating lifeline customers 
(lifeline rate x participation x 12) 
Nonrecurring Cost 
(cost x new hookups) 
Coversion Cost 
(cost x new exisiting) 
Nonrecurring revenues 
(1/2 rate x new hookups) 
Administrative Costs 
a) printing of notification letters 
b) business reply postage on 
questionnare 
c) publicity ( customer notification) 
d) other 
Total ( > 
OTAL COSTS DUE TO LIFELINE 
107. of T o t a l 
surcharge 80% t o a t l c o s t / n o n l i f e l i n e l i n e s / 12 « $ 0 . 0 0 
EXHIBIT B 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
4-, 
In the Matter of the Rulemaking 
for the Establishment of Tele-
phone Lifeline Rates for All 
Regulated Local Exchange Car-
riers in the State of Utah 
CASE NO. 85-999-13 
REPORT AND ORDER 
Appearances: 
Ted Smith 
John W. Horsley 
James J. Cassity 
Gary B. Witt 
Brian W. Burnett, 
Assistant Attorney 
General 




ISSUED: December 17, 1986 
For Mountain Bell 
• Continental Telephone 
Company 
" Utah Independent 
Telephone Association 
" AT&T Communication 
• Division of Public 
Utilities, Department of 
Business Regulation, 
State of Utah 
• Committee of Consumer 
Services 
Salt Lake Community 
Action Program and Utah 
Issues 
By the Commission: 
On June 20, 1985, the Commission issued an order 
instituting rulemaking proceedings for the establishment of 
telephone lifeline rates. Rulemaking was instituted in response 
to a Division of Public Utilities (the "Division") memorandum 
received by the Commission on April 29, 1985. The memorandum 
indicated that on June lf 1985 the Federal Communication 
*% r\ r\ F\ M 
CASE NO, 85-999-13 
- 2 -
Commission (the "FCC") would impose a one dollar ($1.00) charge 
upon all residential customer access lines. The charge was to be 
increased to two dollars ($2.00) on June 1, 1986. 
The memorandum further stated that the FCC had adopted 
by its order of December 27, 1985 the Federal-State Joint Board's 
recommendation that the FCC implement federal lifeline assistance 
measures to assist low-income households in securing telephone 
service. The order provides for a waiver of the federal residen-
tial customer access charge upon condition that the state adopt a 
qualifying plan for local lifeline assistance. To qualify the 
local plan must satisfy the following criteria: 
1. The End User Common Line Charge (also 
referred to as the subscriber line charge or 
CALC) for residential subscribers shall be 
reduced to the extent the state assistance 
equals or exceeds the residential End User 
Common Line Charge. 
2. In order to qualify for this waiver, the 
subscriber must be eligible for and receive 
assistance or benefits provided pursuant to a 
narrowly targeted state lifeline assistance 
plan requiring verification of eligibility, 
implemented by the state or the local tele-
phone company. 
3. The state assistance shall include 
reduced rates for local telephone service, 
service connection charges and customer 
deposits, except that benefits or assistance 
for connection charges and deposit require-
ments may only be counted once annually. 
Such benefits must be for a single telephone 
line, the household's principal residence. 
The Division's memorandum further states: 
"...that the House and Senate sponsors of 
federal legislation which mandate state 
lifeline service have delayed action on their 
bills until after they have evaluated the 
CASE NO. 85-999-13 
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responsiveness of the FCC and State Com-
missions to their concerns." 
On July 2, 1985, a prehearing conference was held 
before the Commission. At the conference, several parties 
suggested issues to be discussed in the evidentiary portion of 
the proceeding, and the schedule was established for filing of 
legal briefs, testimony and a date for hearing. 
On September 5, 1985, the Commission issued a Prehear-
ing Order and Notice of Hearing. In that Order, the Commission 
asked that the parties address several issues, one of which was 
whether or not the Commission had authority to establish lifeline 
rates. The Commission further ordered hearings to be held 
December 16, 1985. 
The Commission heard arguments on the issue of the 
Commission's authority to set lifeline rates on December 16, 
1985. All parties agreed that the Commission was vested with 
sufficient authority to order a lifeline telephone service rate. 
Based upon the legal arguments of the parties, the 
Commission issued a declaratory order on January 3, 1986, which 
concluded that the Commission had authority to construct a 
lifeline telephone service for low-income subscribers. 
On February 18, 1986, the Commission held hearings on 
the design of rates and the classification of the ratepayer who 
would qualify to obtain the lower "lifeline" rate. Testimony was 
presented by the parties, as well as by public witnesses on 
Public Witness Day, February 20, 1986. The parties' witnesses 
were as follows: 
CASE NO. 85-999-13 
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The Division of Public Utilities presented testimony 
through Cary B. Hinton. Mountain Bell presented testimony 
through Orville K. Unruh. Theodore J. Carrier presented 
testimony for Continental Telephone Company, Perry A. Arana and 
Raymond A. Hendershot were witnesses for the Utah Independent 
Telephone Association. Diane Roth presented testimony for AT&T 
Communications. Joe Duke-Rosati was the witness for Salt Lake 
Community Action Program. R. Phil Bullock and Timothy Funk 
testified for the Committee of Consumer Services. 
Based upon the testimony and documentary evidence 
adduced in this matter, the Commission will make the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Nationally, the telephone penetration rate is about 
90.3 percent (90.3%) for all classes of customers. For low-
income persons (who are defined hereinafter by reference to 
eligibility for public welfare assistance programs) the pene-
tration rate is 72 percent (72%) , a differential of almost 20 
percent (20%). In the Mountain Bell service area and in Utah 
specifically, the overall subscriber rate for telephone service 
is approximately ninety-five percent (95%). Among low-income 
households the rate is about 20 percent (20%) less. Among 
apartment dwellers in Mountain Bell's service area, 71 percent 
(71%) of those who have terminated telephone service report that 
they could no longer afford the service and as of April, 1984, 
only 63.2 percent (63.2%) of participants in the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children had telephone service. 
CASE NO. 85-999-13 
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2. Beyond that, it appears that future customer 
drop-off will be significant among low-income subscribers, since 
low-income households have fewer discretionary funds and are at 
greater risk of losing phone service as basic telephone rates 
increase. 
3. The Commission has long supported the policy of 
universal service, by which is meant the offering of affordable 
telephone service to as many of the citizens of the State as 
possible. This policy is likewise endorsed and supported by the 
Congress and the Federal Communications Commission. 
4. Universal service offers substantial benefits to 
all customers. The promotion of universal service means more 
subscribers in the telephone network and greater communications 
access to all. Greater access enhances* business and quality of 
life. Greater access results in greater efficiency in the 
delivery of state social services programs and, thus, better use 
of tax dollars. Maintaining subscribers in the network avoids 
the stranding of capital facilities. 
5. A lifeline rate will promote universal service and, 
thereby, be in the best interests of all telephone customers in 
the State, both local and toll. We conclude that there are sound 
economic reasons for establishing a distinct class of low-income 
residence customers with a lower service rate level than the 
remaining body of residence customers. 
6. In its rules, the Commission requires that tele-
phone companies, whose basic service rates exceed the amount 
nnnfid? 
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allocated for telephone service in the Standard Needs Budget set 
by the State Legislature for the Department of Social Service, 
establish a lifeline telephone service. The amount allocated in 
the Standard Needs Budget at the end of the last legislative 
session was $9.45. Under the lifeline rules, the recipient of a 
lifeline rate must pay the funded portion of the Standard Needs 
Budget plus Extended Area Services (EAS) charges. We conclude 
that such an approach is fair and reasonable in that it ties the 
amount of rate relief given to lifeline recipients to an objec-
tive figure developed by the State Legislature and assures that 
lifeline recipients will not receive more in support for tele-
phone service through lifeline rates and the Standard Needs 
Budget than the rate for service. 
7. The rules provide that any person who is currently 
eligible for one or more of the following state assistance 
programs shall be eligible for the lifeline rate: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children; 
(b) Emergency Work Program; 
(c) Pood Stamps; 
(d) General Assistance; 
(e) Home Energy Assistance Target Program; 
(f) Medical Assistance; 
(g) Refugee Assistance; or 
(h) Supplemental Security Income 
8. The foregoing programs provide a reasonable basis 
for identifying those person in the state who, because of their 
CASE NO. 85-999-13 
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income limitations, do not have telephone service or who may be 
compelled to disconnect their telephone service as rates for 
basic service increase* Tying lifeline service to these programs 
recognizes and adopts the Legislature's conclusions about which 
persons are most in need of public assistance. By adopting these 
programs as eligibility criteria, we also ensure that existing 
mechanisms for determining eligibility are utilized, which 
mechanisms provide a reasonable and cost-effective means of 
verifying continued eligibility for lifeline service. On bal-
ance , our finding that these categories are fair and reasonable 
takes advantage of prior legislative findings that program 
recipients are truly in need of assistance while at the same time 
facilitating reasonable qualifications and verification proce-
dures. 
9. We conclude that the rules for Lifeline Telephone 
Service will address the needs of the low-income residential 
subscribers• 
10. The Commission has the authority to adopt rules 
pertaining to lifeline telephone service pursuant to Section 
54-4-1, 54-4-4(2) , 54-4-7 and particularly 54-3-1, Utah Code. 
The latter section reads in pertinent part: 
"The scope of definition "just and reason-
able" may include, but shall not be limited 
to, the cost of providing service to each 
category of customer, economic impact of 
charges on each category of customer, and on 
the well-being of the State of Utah;" (empha-
sis added) 
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About Section 54-3-1, Utah Code, as cited above, the 
Supreme Court in Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public 
Service Commission, 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981), stated: 
"The 1977 amendments to Section 54-3-1, by 
permitting consideration of the economic 
impact of a rate on each category of custom-
ers, gave legislative approval, in the form 
of binding law, to considerations which may 
relate, directly or indirectly, to "social 
problems." (emphasis added) 
It is evident that the Court has concluded that the 
Commission has authority to enact a lifeline telephone rate to 
meet the needs of a distinct class of low-income residential 
customers under existing law. 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That: 
1. The rules for Lifeline Telephone Service heretofore 
adopted and made effective December 1, 1986 as filed with the 
State Archivist, are hereby affirmed and implemented to be 
effective January 1, 1987, 
2. The companion order issued this date in this same 
docket by which the Commission has adopted a stipulation of the 
parties on the issues of the operation of the lifeline pool and 
the amount of the surcharges for lifeline telephone service in 
the State of Utah is hereby affirmed and implemented to take 
effect January 1, 1987. 
A A A A T A 
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DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of Decem-
ber, 1986. 
Brpcan T.) St^ frartl Chairman 
1 
Brent H. Cameron, commissioner 
4&*«.^, ^ Aft? u, ^ 
Jaafes M. Byrne, Commissioner 
Atte 




- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
$ > 
In the Hatter of the Rulemaking 
of the Establishment of Tele-
phone Lifeline Rates for All 
Regulated Local Exchange Car-
riers in the State of Utah 
CASE NO. 85-999-13 
DECLARATORY ORDER 
ISSUED: January 3, 1986 
By the Commission: 
On June 20. 1985. the Commission issued an Order 
instituting rulemaking proceedings for the establishment 
of telephone lifeline rates. 
On July 2. 1985, a pre-hearing conference was 
held before the Commission. At the Conference, several 
parties suggested issues to be discussed in the 
evidentiary portion of the proceeding. In addition, a 
schedule was established for the filing of legal briefs, 
testimony and a date for hearings. 
On September 5. 1985. the Commission issued a 
prehearing order and notice of hearing. In that order the 
Commission requested the parties to address several 
issues, one of which concerned the Commission's authority 
to establish lifeline rates. The Commission further 
ordered hearings to be held the week of December 16. 1985. 
On December 4, 1985, the Commission ordered that 
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argument concerning our authority to set lifeline rates be 
held on December 16, 1985 and set February 18, 1986 for 
hearing on design of rates. 
The Division of Public Utilities on October 17, 
1985, filed its brief. The Division stated in its brief 
that although the Utah Supreme Court disallowed a lifeline 
rate based upon age, an income classification can be 
justified if there is a rational connection between the 
rate class and statutory criteria for just and reasonable 
rates. In Mountain States Legal Foundation 636 P2d 104 
(1981), the Utah Supreme Court held that a senior citizen 
lifeline rate was unlawful because there were inadequate 
findings of fact to support the findings of the 
Commission. The Division stated that although the court 
has disallowed lifeline rates for senior citizens based 
upon income alone, it has allowed for lifeline rates if: 
(1) there is a rational connection, based upon the 
evidence, between the rate class characteristics and 
statutory criteria for just and reasonable rates and (2) 
there is not an unreasonable price differential between 
rates charged different rate classifications. A rate 
qualifying under these tests is not discriminatory, but 
just and reasonable. The Division concluded that the 
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Commission may order an economy or lifeline telephone 
service rate within just and reasonable rate parameters. 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph (Mountain 
Bell) filed its brief with the Commission on October 11, 
1985. In its brief. Mountain Bell argued that the Utah 
Supreme Court has not precluded lifeline rates and that 
the court has made it clear that special rates for a 
specific class or category of customers may be perfectly 
legal if adequate findings are made by the Commission. 
Continental Telephone Company of the West 
(Continental) filed its brief with the Commission on 
October 11. 1985. It is Continental's position that the 
Commission has authority to establish and fund a lifeline 
rate if its action is supported by valid findings and 
conclusions. 
The Utah Independent Telephone Companies (UITC) 
filed its brief with the Commission on October 10. 1985. 
UITC concluded, based upon the Mountain States decision, 
that the Commission has the authority to establish 
services and rates based upon social considerations such 
as age and income but that the legality of the 
Commission's ultimate decision will have to rest on 
well-articulated findings of fact on all material issues. 
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On December 16.1985, the Commission heard oral 
argument on the legal issues and ruled from the bench that 
the Commission has authority to establish a "lifeline11 
rate. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Commission concludes, based upon the legal 
analysis provided by the parties and the Utah Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Mountain States Legal Foundation, 
that it has the authority to establish a lover rate to 
provide Mlifeline" service to a distinct group of 
ratepayers. 
The Commission also concludes that it may do so 
if a rational connection is established between rate class 
characteristics and statutory criteria for just and 
reasonable rates. Findings of fact to support a rational 
basis for such a classification shall be established in 
subsequent proceedings. 
ORDER 
NOW. THEREFORE. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the 
bench order issued December 16. 1985. that the Commission 
has authority to establish a lower rate to provide 
"lifeline" service is affirmed. 
CASE NO. 85-999-13 
-5-
DATED at Salt Lake City. Utah, this 3rd day of 
January. 1986. 
Brent H. Cameron. Chairman 
Jaiep M„ Byrne. Commissioner 
Brym T.) Stpwarti Commissioner 
Attest ~) 
^iJ^^dj/-
Georgia B. Peterson 
Executive Secretary 
